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“Oh National Characters, what has become of you?”
— Johann Gottfried Von Herder, Another Philosophy of History
IN HIS INTRODUCTION to the 1864 publication of Selections From     Canadian Poets, Edward Hartley Dewart asserted that a “national literature is an essential element in the formation of national charac-
ter. It is not merely the record of a country’s mental progress: it is the ex-
pression of its intellectual life, the bond of national unity, and the guide
of national energy” (ix). While critics today would likely concur, after
Benedict Anderson, that literature has indeed played a significant role in
the production of nationhood, they would be less likely to assent with
Dewart to the necessary virtue of this role, particularly as it validates the
unifying function of a national character. There is an undeniably discred-
ited, atavistic ring to the phrase “national character,” as though anyone
who used it might next be reaching for instruments to measure the cir-
cumference on one’s cranium or the slope of one’s forehead. References
to national character long ago gave way to the more respectable (perhaps
because more philosophical and/or psychological sounding) “national
identity,” although this phrase too can evoke a certain embarrassed un-
easiness. The concept of national identity, along with interrelated concepts
such as a national literature and, indeed, nation itself, have in recent dec-
ades been critically examined from a variety of  perspectives. Historians
have examined the relatively recent origins of “ancient nations” and their
rituals. Poststructuralist theories have been suspicious of the nation’s
claim to a stable unitary identity and its dependence upon organic meta-
phors of growth and maturation. Furthermore, perspectives foreground-
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ing issues of imperialism, race, ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality have
variously looked upon the concept of nation as a central means by which
the conflictual and heterogenous reality of any society is falsely neutral-
ized and homogenized.1 Thus, while the critical study of national litera-
tures may not be proceeding in any single direction, and while critics may
otherwise find little enough to agree upon, it does seem generally agreed
that the notion of literature as the expression of a unified national char-
acter seems outmoded, a legacy of the eighteenth century and, in particu-
lar, the Romantic period, of which we have now divested ourselves.
In the Canadian context, recent metacritical reflection has chal-
lenged what Frank Davey calls “metaphors of unity” (19), such as
Northrop Frye’s influential “garrison mentality,” articulated most fa-
mously in Frye’s conclusion to the 1965 edition of the Literary History of
Canada.  Such metaphors, in Jonathan Kertzer’s words, implied that “all
cultural expressions are shaped by the same national character” (21). One
might take the concluding words of W.H. New’s introduction to the
fourth volume of the Literary History of Canada, published in 1990 and
covering the period from 1972 to 1984, as definitively marking the move-
ment away from such older critical assumptions:
As far the 1970s and 1980s are concerned, historians essentially gave
up any fixed notion of the ‘whole’ society; the whole was inappre-
hensible, in flux. Criticism, too, edged away from seeing literature as
foremost an expression of a single national character. Recent research
in psychology called into question a related notion about the whole-
ness of the self. (xxxii)
The Zeitgeist, it would seem, has moved beyond national character.
In keeping with the critical examination of nation and national iden-
tity, Canadian literary and cultural criticism over the last number of years
has emphasized the view that Canadians have no single, definable national
identity, except, perhaps, insofar as Canadians’ peculiar awareness of
multiplicity and difference might itself be said to constitute an identity
in contrast to the more statically and totalizingly conceived identities of
other nations. (Often the implicit or explicit point of reference here is the
United States.) Likewise, it is asserted that Canadians share an ironic sense
of identity, an identity characterized by doubleness and an awareness of
the plural, differential, discursive and hence unstable nature of identity,
be these identities of gender, race, ethnicity, or that which most problem-
atically attempts to encompass all of these — nation.
This paper will examine the theory of Canadian identity as a name-
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less, absent, or at best ironic identity, as it has been articulated by Robert
Kroetsch and Linda Hutcheon, both of whom have influenced the direc-
tions of Canadian criticism over the last two decades and who may, there-
fore, be taken to represent broader assumptions. In what might seem a
startling but I hope also an edifying juxtaposition, the paper then seeks to
bring these recent statements into relation with other statements on aesthet-
ics, irony, and national (non-)identity deriving from the mid to late eight-
eenth century — an era historians generally look to as a formative period
of modern nationalism. My purpose is not to argue, contra Kroetsch and
Hutcheon, that there is in fact a stable and unitary national identity in
Canada, or elsewhere for that matter. I attempt to show, rather, that asser-
tions concerning the essentially ironic quality of a particular nation’s iden-
tity, and what I take to be parallel assertions to the effect that a nation’s
people possess no defining character, are in fact longstanding, recurring
features of the discourses of nation. Indeed, Friedrich Schlegel’s late eight-
eenth-century theories of irony, from which our contemporary under-
standing is derived, is inextricably tied to his imaginings of an emergent
German national character, a character which is conceived of in terms par-
allel to his theory of the structure of irony. Such repetitions suggest that we
need to think more critically about whether such assertions, as is often as-
sumed, effectively critique or move beyond older, and supposedly more
naive and rigidly totalizing conceptions of nation and national character.
To assert an ironic identity or the absence of identity may indeed be one
very traditional way of aestheticizing a particular nation’s character and of
privileging this people as the more universal people and the nation of the
future.
* * *
In the essay “No Name Is My Name,” collected in The Lovely Treachery
of Words, Kroetsch suggests that Canadian literature has long resisted and
put into question assertions of a stable definable identity, whether such
assertions be as specific as the identity of the self or as general as the iden-
tity of the nation. In arguing this idea he points fascinatingly to what he
sees as the uncanny repetition — from the pre-confederation writings of
Thomas Haliburton’s Sam Slick stories, to Sinclair Ross’s As for Me and
My House, A.M. Klein’s The Second Scroll, Hubert Aquin’s Prochain Epi-
sode, and Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing — of a nameless narrator: the sup-
posed origin and centre of the narrative that refuses to name itself. He
invites us to think contrastingly of that cornerstone of the American lit-
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erary tradition that begins with the confident assertion of name: “Call me
Ishmael.” In the American tradition, Kroetsch argues, when nameless
characters appear, as in Ralph Ellison’s The Invisible Man, their name-
lessness has often been imposed upon them by oppressive social forces;
in the Canadian tradition namelessness is a self-imposed and deliberate
strategy (44). Such namelessness, furthermore, makes itself evident not
only in a nameless narrator, but in the characteristically marginal loca-
tions of much Canadian literature, such as Sinclair Ross’s fictional prai-
rie town of Horizon, which, as Kroetsch writes, “suggests a no-place that
is tantalizingly visible but always out of reach: a version of namelessness”
(44). And novels such as Klein’s The Second Scroll and Atwood’s Surfac-
ing, in addition to having unnamed narrators, explore self-consciously the
difficulties of naming — the problematic relation of sign and referent.
Kroetsch suggests toward the end of the essay that this prevalence of
namelessness and problems of naming in Canadian literature may be sig-
nificant for several reasons. The initial reasons he lists would regard
namelessness as a negative condition that might eventually be surmounted
in the positivity of an achieved identity. First, there is the problem the Ca-
nadian writer in English or French confronts of writing in a language
inherited from elsewhere. Kroetsch writes, “The problem then is not so
much that of knowing one’s identity as it is that of how to relate that
newly evolving identity to its inherited or ‘given’ names. And the first
technique might be simply to hold those names in suspension, to let the
identity speak itself out of a willed namelessness” (51). Second, Kroetsch
relates such namelessness to Canada’s sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the
United States and what Kroetsch conceives as America’s own powerfully
confident “definitions of self, freedom, heroism, society, nature, happi-
ness” (51). These definitions Kroetsch locates in nineteenth-century
American Romanticism, which provides the informing basis of American
literature. Canadian literature by contrast is largely a product of the later
twentieth century when all such definitions have been placed in consid-
erable doubt by pressures from historical and theoretical sources. And
further to this sense of powerlessness as a source of namelessness, Kroetsch
tacitly invokes Frye’s garrison mentality to suggest that the enormous
pressure the community has placed upon the individual in Canadian
culture can lead to an erasure of self (51).
These, then, are several possible understandings of  namelessness in
Canadian culture as a negative condition that one might desire to sur-
mount in order to achieve a positive identity. Kroetsch does not disqualify
these reasons, but his points here are not particularly original and they are
NAMELESSNESS, IRONY, AND NATIONAL CHARACTER   9
not, one senses, where his interest lies. He concludes, rather, by suggest-
ing that Canadians might look at such namelessness in a more positive
light. Namelessness may indeed be a space of freedom and plurality, a
generative place, just as the nameless narrators of the texts Kroetsch ex-
amines end up, despite their namelessness, and perhaps because of their
namelessness, generating story. Kroetsch concludes,
It may be the villain (namelessness) turns out to be the hero in the story
of the Canadian story. The nameless figure who seems to threaten us
may in fact be leading us to high ground. To avoid a name does not (as
Haliburton’s narrator so well realized) deprive one of an identity; in-
deed, it may offer a plurality of identities. Like the epic hero of old, we
might even lay claim to a certain virtue in our ability to withhold and
deceive. In a willful misremembering of Homer’s Odysseus we might
say, ambiguously, proudly, tauntingly, no name is my name! (52)
Taking this line of argument, one might regard the fact that “No Name”
has become, in certain Canadian supermarkets, a successful brand-name
for cheap generic groceries as a further testament to this curiously perva-
sive, but perhaps after all valorous, negation of identity in Canadian cul-
ture. As Kroetsch says, “we cannot name our own brands of booze with
any sense of conviction” (47).
That for Kroetsch the Canadian identity should reside in a certain
namelessness is in keeping with his suggestion, explored in the essay
“Disunity as Unity: A Canadian Strategy,” that “Canada is a postmodern
country” (22). An “assumed story” or a “meta-narrative,” Kroetsch asserts
in this essay “has traditionally been basic to nationhood” (21). Again
Kroetsch’s point of reference is primarily the United States. He writes,
“An obvious example [of such a metanarrative] is the persistence of The
American Dream, with its assumptions about individual freedom, the
importance of the frontier, the immigrant experience” (21). Tradition-
ally, one of the functions of art, Kroetsch argues, has been the location
and elaboration of such national metanarratives. Unlike Americans, how-
ever, Canadians have never been able to agree upon an overarching shared
story that would encompass and unify their nationhood. We see this for
example in the often commented-upon absence of national heroes in
Canadian culture, those central characters in a metanarrative of nation.
In its culture and its politics Canada has been characterized, rather, by de-
bate and irresolution about its defining metanarrative, by both a search
for and a resistance to metanarrative. Like the namelessness that is Cana-
da’s name, this disunity, Kroetsch suggests, is in fact Canada’s unity. Like
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namelessness, disunity is not a negative condition that should be be-
moaned. The debate and irresolution of disunity is valorized as an open-
ended Bakhtinian dialogism that permits of freedom and heterogeneity.
As Kroetsch writes, “we [Canadians] survive by working with a low level
of self definition and national definition. We insist on staying multiple”
(28).
Thus, in its Lyotardian incredulity toward the unifying metanarrative
Canada has long been a postmodern nation — and Kroetsch finds it sig-
nificant that it should have been the government of Quebec that commis-
sioned this French philosopher to write The Postmodern Condition (22).
To the extent that the world is becoming more postmodern, Canada,
Kroetsch implies, is ahead of the game, further along the historical path,
certainly than the United States. Canada was largely invisible in the cen-
tralizing era of modernism, but now that we have entered the postmodern
epoch of the margins Canada is coming into its own. And to the extent
that nations have traditionally depended upon unifying metanarratives,
Canada may be, in the phrase of another of Kroetsch’s essays in this col-
lection, “beyond nationalism” (64). Canada is, Kroetsch seems to imply,
paradoxically a postnational nation.
Kroetsch’s views as I have outlined them are supported by Linda
Hutcheon in Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies, which cites
Kroetsch among many other writers and artists in elaborating upon a
similar, and once again avowedly postmodern, view of Canadian culture
and identity. In her preface to this work Hutcheon likewise points to the
apparent problem of establishing Canadian national identity and pro-
poses as “the simple, if somewhat perverse” premise of the book that “in-
stead of lamenting our state and status as Canadians in search of an
identity, instead of bewailing our fate in the name of some sort of collec-
tive cultural inferiority complex, … we make a virtue out of the fence-
sitting, bet-hedging sense of the difficult doubleness of being Canadian
yet North American, of being Canadian yet part of a multinational, global
political economy.” “That virtue’s name,” Hutcheon asserts, “may well
be irony” (vii).
Irony, Hutcheon elaborates, while it exists in multiple forms, is
preeminently a trope of doubleness. It sets up some sort of opposition and
either, as in straightforward verbal irony, avowedly says one thing while
meaning the opposite or, in what Hutcheon describes as New Critical
Irony, attempts a heroic synthesis of contradictory positions or, as in what
she describes as postmodern irony, allows the contradictions to remain
“delight[ing] in each other and their mutual provisionality” (12). While
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Hutcheon allows that ironies of different sorts abound in Canada, it is
clearly this postmodern irony that she takes to be the most currently sig-
nificant. And Canada is fertile ground for such irony: “There certainly
seems,” Hutcheon writes, “little in Canada that is not (or has not been)
inherently doubled and therefore at least structurally ripe for ironizing.
Its history offers many a binary opposition: native/colonial, federal/pro-
vincial, not to mention English/French” (15). The “particular space of
irony in Canada,” she asserts, “has been mapped out over more than a
century of negotiating the many dualities and multiplicities that have
come to define this nation” (vii). If irony is a virtue, Canada promises to
be, indeed, a virtuous nation.
Hutcheon’s notion of Canada’s ironic national identity is allied with
Kroetsch’s notion of the namelessness thatt is Canada’s name and the
disunity that is its unity. Irony as a trope of negation likewise refuses
stable identity and resolution. Hutcheon quotes Raymond Filip as an
example of the irony of Canadian identity: “I am nothing left to be but
Canadian” (65). Here, in this emptying out of national identity, irony
and namelessness conjoin. As with Kroetsch’s validation of namelessness
and disunity, Hutcheon sees in irony or non-identity a critique of older,
more rigid and naive notions of nation and national identity. “The en-
tire question of Canadian identity,” Hutcheon writes, “has become a kind
of playground — or battlefield — for the postmodern as well as the post-
colonial defining of ‘difference’ and value” (84); Hutcheon asserts of
various verbal and visual ironies in Canadian culture that they “decon-
struct the Canadian identity” — that they subvert in the name of differ-
ence and plurality whatever might have been taken as defining Canadian
identity such as its “male, Anglo-Saxon, and capitalist defining essences”
(84).
* * *
While Hutcheon and Kroetsch’s theories of the irony and/or namelessness
of national identity present themselves, in part, as a critique of more con-
ventional, authoritatively unifying assertions of national identity, these
assertions, I would suggest, need to be understood as part of a lengthy
tradition of aestheticizing national character : that is, of drawing an iden-
tity between aesthetic form (variously conceived within such categories
as the beautiful, the sublime, and the ironic) and the character of a “na-
tional people.” Benedict Anderson’s influential conception of the nation
as an “imagined community” suggests a fundamental homology between
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the nation and the aesthetic artifact, and we frequently find aesthetic and
nationalist discourses inextricably intertwined and supporting one an-
other as each discourse attempts to comprehend and to mediate the re-
lation of the general and the individual.2
Perhaps one of the most explicit and fascinating examples of the
aestheticizing of national character is provided by Immanuel Kant’s trea-
tise Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, an early “pre-
critical” work published in 1764, seventeen years prior to the publication
of the first of his three major critiques. The fourth and final section of this
treatise is devoted to a consideration of the aesthetic characteristics of dif-
ferent nationalities. Here Kant articulates what we might see as a para-
digm in the construction and aestheticizing of national character: the
representation of the privileged national character (usually the one be-
longing to the writer) as a beautiful synthesis, a sublime surpassing, or an
ironic hovering between the extremes represented by the characters of other
nations.3 Thus of the German national character Kant asserts,
The German has a feeling mixed from that of an Englishman and that
of a Frenchman, but appears to come nearer to the first, and any
greater similarity to the latter is only affected and imitated. [The
German] has a fortunate combination of feeling, both in that of the
sublime and in that of the beautiful; and if in the first he does not
equal an Englishman, nor in the second a Frenchman, he yet sur-
passes both in so far as he unites them. He displays more complai-
sance in society than the first, and if indeed he does not bring as
much pleasant liveliness and wit into the company as the Frenchman,
still he expresses more moderation and understanding. (104)
As Ian Balfour has shown in his examination of aesthetics and national
character in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we see here first how
“the nation of the other is construed in reductive, violent ways, whether
in negative or positive terms; [and second how] one’s own nation is read
as complex and heterogeneous, and in such a way as to elevate that nation,
sometimes to a height above all others.”4 Kroetsch, in his predication of
a complex and heterogeneous Canadian identity that contrasts with a
rather monolithically conceived American identity, is engaged in a par-
allel manoeuvre.
If Kant’s example allows us to see very explicitly the aestheticizing
of national character and the use of such an aesthetic discourse to privi-
lege one nation over another in ways that invite comparison to Kroetsch
and Hutcheon, Kant’s statement differs from these contemporary theo-
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rists by suggesting that the German national character is both a synthe-
sis and a transcendence, a “uniting” and “surpassing,” of the English
and French national characters. We must turn to Friedrich Schlegel in
the later eighteenth century, one of the key theorists of Romanticism,
to find a writer who imagines the German national character, in ways
more strikingly parallel to Kroetsch and Hutcheon, as a kind of non-
synthetic or negative dialectic between the polarities that he contrast-
ingly imagines as being constituted by the English and French national
characters. The name Schlegel gives to this non-synthetic dialectic is
irony.
Schlegel’s concept of irony has been variously interpreted and debated
by generations of Romanticists.5 The deliberately fragmentary, aphoristic,
enigmatic, and even ironic fashion in which Schlegel makes his pronounce-
ments on irony are the stuff of which academic industries are made. None-
theless, most discussions regard a non-synthetic alternation, or hovering,
between opposing positions to be central to Schlegel’s concept of irony
(Eichner 63; Handwerk 15). In one influential statement Schlegel charac-
terizes this as a fluctuation between “self-creation and self-destruction”:
Naive is what is or seems to be natural, individual, or classical to the
point of irony, or else to the point of continuously fluctuating between
self-creation and self-destruction. If it’s simply instinctive, then it’s
childlike, childish, or silly; if it’s merely intentional, then it gives rise to
affectation. The beautiful, poetical, ideal naive must combine intention
and instinct. The essence of intention is in this sense freedom, though
intention isn’t consciousness by a long shot. (Athenaeum 51)6
Irony, to briefly rehearse Schlegel’s crucial articulation in this fragment,
which draws upon a complex background of post-Kantian theory (most
notably in Schiller’s famous distinction between naive and sentimental
poetry) is conceived of as that which combines the instinctual and the
intentional, in the sense of fluctuating between them. “Instinct” is here
equated with nature and the natural, instinctual forces within us. We
cannot be wholly conscious of or control such forces, and thus they stand
as the negation of the self understood as an at least partially autonomous
agent. Therefore, that which is dominated by instinct is “merely childlike,
childish, or silly.” “Intention” is that which opposes such natural or in-
stinctive forces, attempting to rework them according to some design of
one’s own, a process that affirms and creates the self. Thus “the essence
of intention is in this sense freedom.”
The dialectic of self-creation and self-destruction is played out in
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the artist’s movement vis-à-vis the work between the instinctive and the
intentional, the natural and the willed or invented. For Schlegel, the way
to achieve such a movement is to alternate between enthusiasm and
skepticism, “inspiration and criticism” (Athenaeum 116), toward the crea-
tive artifact, alternately affirming it as natural and true and negating such
a naive position by recognizing that it is invented or constructed. Thus
irony, Schlegel asserts in his notebooks, is “a permanent parabasis [eine
permanente Parekbase]” (Kritische Ausgabe 18: 85) — parabasis being a
term for those moments in ancient Greek comedy when the chorus would
speak to the audience in the name of the author, thus dispelling the illu-
sion of the play.
The lengthier fragment  Lyceum 108, in defining irony as “the only
involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation,” reiterates and
expands upon the antinomies that irony brings into conjunction and
holds in play: the “playful and serious,” the “guilelessly open and deeply
hidden,” “savoir vivre and scientific spirit,” a “perfectly instinctive and a
perfectly conscious philosophy.” In a crucial articulation Schlegel then
indicates one of the key purposes of such a non-synthetic dialectic:
“[Irony] contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between
the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity
of complete communication” (Lyceum 108; emphasis added). Perhaps the
chief concern of Schlegel’s fragments is this “indissoluble antagonism.”
One crucial form this takes, in the wake of Kant and German idealism, is
Schlegel’s concern with system.
A philosophical system is an attempt to construct an absolute of
sorts, a totality within which each particular finds its meaning and its
place. Schlegel, however, will repeatedly emphasize (in metaphors that
clearly import the political concerns underlying his theoretical position)
the violence that any system and its concepts must perform upon the
particular in order to marshall it into a system: “The demonstrations of
philosophy are simply demonstrations in the sense of military jargon. And
its deductions aren’t much better than those of politics; even in the sci-
ences possession is nine-tenths of the law” (Athenaeum 82). The totality
presented by a system is always only what Schlegel describes, in a sugges-
tive phrase that anticipates later theories of ideology, most notably
Jameson’s “strategies of containment” as “polemical totality” (Athenaeum
399), a partial, interested version of the whole.
Schlegel will also affirm, however, that concepts and indeed system are
both inescapable and necessary: “Since people are always so much against
hypotheses, they should try sometime to begin studying history without
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one. It’s impossible to say that a thing is, without saying what it is. In the
very process of thinking of facts, one relates them to concepts, and, surely,
it is not a matter of indifference to which” (Athenaeum 226). “Formal logic
and empirical psychology,” Schlegel elsewhere maintains, “are philosophical
grotesques. For whatever is interesting in an arithmetic of the four elements
or in an experimental physics of the spirit can surely only derive from a
contrast of form and content” (Athenaeum 75; emphasis added).
Given Schlegel’s emphasis upon both the violence and the necessity
of the concept, his philosophical position is best summed up in his fa-
mous dictum, “It’s equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have
none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two” (Athenaeum 53).
Irony, as Schlegel’s term for the dialectical interplay of such antinomies,
for the “indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative”
(Lyceum 108), and for the “contrast of form and content,” best describes
his aesthetic and philosophical ideal. In a manner that strongly attests to
the interconnections between discourses of aesthetics and nationalism,
Schlegel constructs the German national character in ways that parallel
this philosophical and aesthetic ideal.
Among Schlegel’s fragments that theorize about irony and Romantic
poetry are numerous others, largely forgotten, devoted to, among other
things, national character, particularly the characters of the French, Eng-
lish, and German peoples. Schlegel conceives of the German national
character as fluctuating between the totalizingly conceived identities of
the French and English: between the “strange and rather tasteless univer-
sality” (Athenaeum 423) of French political and philosophical radicalism
on the one hand, a sort of French will-to-system, and the “pathological
history of common sense” (Athenaeum 61) provided by English empiri-
cism on the other hand. Like the ironic aesthetic artifact, the German
national character  fluctuates between and mediates the universal and the
particular, the body and the head, the ordered and the spontaneous, sys-
tem and its absence.
Athenaeum 360 critiques the overly systematic character of French
thought:
If any art exists that could be called the black art, then it must be the
art of making nonsense fluent, clear, and flexible, and of organizing
it into a mass. The French possess masterpieces of this kind. Every
great calamity is at its deepest root a serious grimace, a mauvaise
plaisanterie. Therefore, all hail and honor to those heroes who never tire
of struggling against a folly that often carries in its most trivial aspects
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the germ of an endless succession of horrible devastations! Lessing and
Fichte are the princes of peace of future centuries.  (Athenaeum 360)
Schlegel’s thought, as we have seen, represents an attempt to negotiate
between system and its pretensions to totality on the one hand and, on
the other hand, the “equally fatal” (Athenaeum 53) predicament of hav-
ing no system, no perspective upon the whole. Athenaeum 360 clearly
indicates the political motivation for the initial moment of this dialectic
movement — the critique of system. French thought is here represented
as propounding facile systems, constructed too hastily, whose apparent
truths and worldly applications are too easily grasped by too many, result-
ing in this “endless succession of horrible devastations.” Following the
logic of the contrast Schlegel establishes between French and German
thought the latter, here represented by the predominantly aesthetic and
philosophical writers Lessing and Fichte, is valorized for being, by impli-
cation, complex, esoteric, non-instrumental, and thus lacking any dan-
gerous revolutionary applications.
If Schlegel’s French with their “strange and rather tasteless univer-
sality” are represented as overly abstract, rational, and systematic, his
English are represented as the binary opposite of this polarity. They are
persistently  associated with a vulgar materiality and a dull “common
sense” (Athenaeum 61) empiricism. Thus the French and English are
rather arbitrarily placed within the overall structure of Schlegel’s philo-
sophical/aesthetic problematic with its attempt to negotiate between the
universal and the particular, system and non-system.
The  picture of a peculiarly English materialism is repeatedly empha-
sized in Schlegel’s Fragments. Schlegel refers to Gibbon’s love of the Ro-
man’s “materialistic pomp” and suggests snidely that “a country divided
between mercantilism and mathematics [i.e., England]” can only respect
a “quantitative nobility” (Athenaeum 219). In Schlegel’s Fragments, then,
the English stand in for the object world, materiality itself. In terms of a
“national mind set,” the association of the English with the material ob-
ject is consistent with associating them with an atheoretical empiricism,
a way of thinking that remains fixated upon the merely particular and
thus fails to achieve any generalized, theoretical understanding. Thus
“English criticism,” Schlegel asserts, “consists of nothing but applying the
philosophy of common sense (which is itself only a permutation of the
natural and scholastic philosophies) to poetry without any understanding
for poetry” (Athenaeum 389).  Athenaeum 61 also derides the merely
“common sense” attitude of the “English mind,” but even more signifi-
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cantly it does so in a manner explicitly articulating a nationalist struggle
between English and German thought. This fragment thus forms a coun-
terpart to Athenaeum 360, which, as discussed above, contrasts French
and German thought. In its entirety the fragment reads: “The few attacks
against Kantian philosophy which exist are the most important docu-
ments for a pathological history of common sense. This epidemic, which
started in England, even threatened for a while to infect German philoso-
phy” (Athenaeum 61; emphasis added). In direct contrast to French
thought which in its excessive universalizing is “strongly hostile to in-
stinct” (Athenaeum 296), divorced from the body, the figuration of Eng-
lish common sense as a “pathological” disease threatening to “infect”
German thought confirms its material bodily status but as an equally
unhealthy excess.
The model of the German national character in Schlegel’s Fragments
is determined, by its carefully constructed interplay between the French
and English national characters, between the “philosophical grotesques”
of “formal logic and empirical psychology” (Athenaeum 75). The ideal
national character is epitomized in the figures of the critic/intellectual and
the artist, or most ideally (as Schlegel fashioned himself and romantic
poetry as a whole), in that which is at once both creative and self-reflec-
tively critical, which is to say by one of the several senses of the term one
can trace in the Fragments, that which is ironic.
In Ideas 120 Friedrich Schlegel most emphatically posits the German
artist and intellectual’s character as an ideal type:
The spirit of the old heroes of German art and science will remain
ours for as long as we are Germans. The German artist either has no
character at all [keinen Charakter] or else that of an Albrecht Dürer,
Kepler, Hans Sachs, or of a Luther and Jacob Böhme. Righteous,
guileless, thorough, precise, and profound is this character, but also in-
nocent and somewhat clumsy.  (Ideas 120; emphasis added)
This account of the German artist’s character, and by extension the Ger-
man national character of which it is the ideal type, are consistent with
Schlegel’s theorization of irony in Athenaeum 51 as discussed above. In
“combin[ing] intention and instinct,” the German national character will
either have “no character at all” as one cancels out the other in a dialec-
tic of “self-creation and self-destruction” (Athenaeum 51), or it will have
a character that hovers between both, that is “righteous, guileless, thor-
ough, precise, and profound … but also innocent and somewhat clumsy.”
18   SCL/ÉLC
Irony here is the aesthetic mode that privileges the German over the
French and the English. In his namelessness the German is the more com-
plex, heterogenous, and open-ended national character.
* * *
While it is Hutcheon who most overtly names the Canadian identity as
an ironic one, it is Kroetsch who most perfectly rehearses Schlegel’s
privileging of a national character in terms of an ironic fluctuation be-
tween system, or order, and its absence — polarities figured as the na-
tional characteristics of two other nations. With respect to the nameless
narrator in Thomas Haliburton’s Sam Slick stories, Kroetsch maintains
that despite the pre-Confederation publication date of the work, we can
find in this narrator a kind of paradigm of the Canadian national char-
acter. Haliburton’s unnamed Squire is both attracted to the carnivalesque
energy of the Yankee Sam Slick, a plain-speaking “destroyer of hierar-
chies” (43), and simultaneously attracted to the order and law of his Brit-
ish heritage. “We see here,” Kroetsch asserts, “an early manifestation of
the Canadian personality. The man who exploits social hierarchy by be-
ing falsely named into it wants also to be free of it. He wants to have a
system that gives him identity and stature, but he wants to be free of that sys-
tem” (42; emphasis added). In yet more generalizing terms Kroetsch
writes in “Beyond Nationalism: A Prologue” that “Canadians seek the lost
and everlasting moment when chaos and order were synonymous. They
seek that timeless split second in time when the one, in the process of
becoming the other, was itself the other” (68). As with Schlegel’s more
overtly nationalistic discourse, Kroetsch’s avowedly postmodern and even
postnational discourse figures the privileged Canadian national charac-
ter as existing in a complex tension between system and non-system,
conceived as the contrasting national characters of two other nations. In
this non-synthetic, or negative, dialectic between two polarities, the name-
less Canadian, much as Schlegel asserts of the German artist, may have
“keinen Charakter,” but such an absence, rather than being conceived of
as a shortcoming, is a space of freedom and generation. Kroetsch explic-
itly associates this process with irony in asserting that Haliburton remains
self-conscious of his strategy and what he could achieve with it. “But Hali-
burton, in his first ‘refusing to name’ scene, was brilliantly aware of the
ironies of his posture” (44; emphasis added).
I will consider three final examples to further establish a tradition of
predicating an absence of national character as a strategy of privileging a
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particular national character, the first from the mid-eighteenth century,
the second from the later eighteenth century, and the third from the twen-
tieth century just prior to Kroetsch’s and Hutcheon’s assertions but of-
ten regarded as representing critical assumptions that contemporary
critics have put into question.
David Hume’s essay “Of National Characters,” published 1748, is in
many respects a sensitive, Enlightenment-era argument against the “climate
theory” of national characteristics proposed by Charles Montesquieu,
among others (Richards 142) — the idea that national character might be
based upon what Hume calls “physical causes” (200) such as soil or climate,
an idea that would have a dangerous trajectory over the next two centuries
of European and world history. National character, Hume argues, is, rather,
the product of what he calls “moral causes” which include “the nature of
the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury
in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its
neighbors, and such like circumstances” (198). As such, Hume points
out, national character is subject to change and evolution rather than
being some organic quiddity that springs from the unique character of cli-
mate and soil. This admirable position does not preclude Hume, however,
from reducing various nations of Europe to single characteristics. “The
ARABIC is uncouth and disagreeable: The MUSCOVITE soft and mu-
sical” (209). When Hume arrives at the English, however, such reduction
strikes him as being no longer possible, and he asserts, “the ENGLISH of
any people in the universe, have the least of a national character; unless this
very singularity may pass for such” (207; emphasis added). For Hume such
an absence of national character among the English is a testament to the
freedom afforded by English society and its mixture of monarchical, aristo-
cratic, and democratic institutions, which produce what Defoe likewise
praised as “that Het’rogenous Thing, An Englishman” (qtd. in Anderson x).
Again, one’s own nation is the complex and heterogenous, even to the point
of having “keinen Charakter.”
Kant in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View — a work
published in 1797, late in his career, although based upon popular lectures
he had delivered for decades (Gregor ix) — returns to his earlier concerns
with national character and takes particular issue with Hume. Kant per-
ceived clearly that Hume was attempting to privilege the English by refusing
to attribute any fixed national character to the nation, and he would have
none of it. He countered — in what can be read as an anthropological and
nationalistic application of his philosophical argument with Hume con-
cerning the status of the a priori — that Hume “is mistaken. … England
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and  France,” he writes, “are perhaps the only nations to which we can as-
sign a definite and … unchangeable inborn character, which is the source
of their acquired and conventional character” (Anthropology 174). As con-
cerns the English, “this character is arrogant rudeness, as opposed to the
courtesy that lends itself to easy familiarity” (174). On the other hand, Kant
asserts that the German is a “a man of all countries and climes” (179).
Germans furthermore “have no national pride and are too cosmopolitan to
be deeply attached to their homeland” (180; emphasis added). Clearly what
is at stake in Kant’s argument with Hume is, once again, the negation of
national character as a means of privileging a particular nation over others.
In its negation of national character, contemporary Canadian criti-
cism conceives of itself, as I suggested at the outset, in opposition to a
previous generation of critics. Scholars such as Northrop Frye are said to
have provided “metaphors of unity” (Davey 19) through which they sug-
gested that “all cultural expressions are shaped by the same national char-
acter” (Kertzer 21). In “Disunity as Unity” Kroetsch explicitly situates his
argument against Frye, noting that “the writers of stories and poems
nowadays, in Canada, are not terribly sympathetic to Frye and his uni-
fying sense of what a mythic vision is” (24).
Furthermore, in recent work on multicultural writing in Canada the
perceived construction of stable and homogenous notions of national
identity in earlier Canadian culture and criticism is a central target of
critique. In her introduction to her 1996 anthology of multicultural
Canadian writers, Smaro Kamboureli argues the “presumed uniqueness
of Canadian identity is only that — a presumption. Making a Difference
is testimony to the fact that we can no longer harbour the conceit that
Canadian identity is homogenous” (10). When Robert Lecker character-
izes Frye’s attempt to theorize Canadian identity as being “characteristi-
cally mythopoeic, formal, centralist, Protestant, male-centred, and
overwhelmingly English” (284), we can see that, at least for some, Frye
stands in as the central figure for the positing of a unified and homoge-
neous national character. Yet an attentive reading of Frye’s Canadian lit-
erary and cultural theory, at least, would show that it is marked by a
similar negation of national character and assertion of heterogeneity such
as I have been tracing here.7
At various points in his essays on Canadian culture, Frye juxtaposes
the Canadian identity with American identity. The American, Frye main-
tains, has a “deductive or a priori” (Bush 218) attitude that tends to im-
pose a rigid and unified pattern on cultural life. This is the result of “being
founded on a revolution and a written constitution” (218), a constitution
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that provides the blue print it then imposes on society. One of the first
principles of such an outlook Frye asserts is that “violence pays” (Divi-
sions 46). Canada on the other hand, from its British, Burkean heritage,
“adheres more to the inductive and the expedient” (Bush 218-19). By
virtue of having a less rigid a priori mind, the Canadian, Frye asserts, has
a much more fragmented and heterogeneous national identity. Indeed,
anticipating the postmodern assertions of Hutcheon and Kroetsch, Frye
asserts that Canadian identity is the absence of identity: “Canada never
defined itself as a unified society in the [American] way: there is no Ca-
nadian way of life, no hundred per cent Canadian, no ancestral figures
corresponding to Washington or Franklin or Jefferson, no eighteenth-
century self-evident certainties about human rights, no symmetrically laid
out country” (Divisions 48). Frye here follows the paradigm in the con-
struction of national character that I have been tracing. The nation of the
other is rigid and unified, one’s own is complex and heterogeneous even
to the point of having “keinen Charakter.” The Americans stand in here
for Frye as the rigidly and uniformly structured people as do the English
for Kroetsch and Kant,  the French for Schlegel, and various nations for
Hume — the names change but the structure and purpose of the model
remains the same.8
In theorizing the irony or namelessness of Canadian identity, Kroetsch
and Hutcheon draw on a longstanding relation between aesthetic form, the
ironic, negating art works they discuss, and national character. The aes-
thetic forms of these works, they suggest, are characteristic of “us.” One
might counter that the trope of irony gets these theorists off the hook in
terms of aestheticizing national character in so far as irony at its most
vertiginous posits no specific content but resists all naming. But such an
empty space, devoid of all determinate content but pregnant with the
possibilities of the multiple identities it might become, is in some respects,
as theorized for example in Schiller’s Aesthetic Education, the very defini-
tion of the aesthetic in its desired purity and freedom.9 And although it
lies beyond the purview of this paper to explore the issue in detail, there
may be troubling and unexamined intersections between the negation of
national identity in the critical tradition and the construction of white-
ness in the discourses of race and ethnicity of the last two centuries and
more. Characterizing the arguments of a body of contemporary critical
inquiry on issues of race, ethnicity, and gender, Daniel Coleman has
written, “the power of dominant cultural groups is characterized by their
freedom from naming and scrutiny, … whites avoid nomination as sub-
jects of race, Anglo-Celts as subjects of ethnicity, and men as subjects of
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gender” (85). To which list one might add nations as subjects of national
character. Certainly Kant who, as we have seen, privileged the German
as being beyond nationality, also maintained in an early and influential
body of race theory, as Mark Larrimore has recently explored, that whites
were not a race (105).
Assertions of the irony, namelessness, or absence of national charac-
ter have, then, a curious and lengthy history of repetitions, one which seems
to be commensurate with modern nationalist discourses themselves. As the
epigraph to this paper suggests, even Herder, often cited a central source of
Romantic notions of a unified national character expressed organically
through a nation’s entire way of life, self-consciously confronts national
character as an absence in apostrophizing, “Oh National Characters, what
has become of you?” If, as Marc Redfield has recently argued, the nation
like the “imagination” is an “aesthetic, unstable figure that tropes anonym-
ity as identity, and difference as homogeneity” (66), then this makes ano-
nymity and/or heterogeneity and difference structurally necessary in the
dialectic of the nation — an ongoing dialectic of (to bastardize Schlegel)
“[national] creation and [national] destruction.” Furthermore, the negation
of national identity, or the assertion of an ironic sense of national identity,
appears to be one of the very old strategies by which a nationalist discourse
validates a particular nation over other nations as being the more univer-
sal people and the people of the future, as in that paradoxical assertion,
which one can trace from the eighteenth century to the postmodern era,
that one’s own nation is the postnational nation. The delineation of such a
history makes it more difficult to say that such assertions provide a critique
of more rigid and totalizing conceptions of national identity — indeed they
must always invoke them — and much less that they move us “beyond
nationalism.”
NOTES
1 The essays collected in Eric Hobsbawm’s The Invention of Tradition have been influ-
ential in arguing that the putatively ancient rituals of many nations are of relatively recent
invention. With respect to poststructuralists’ perspective on the nation, one could trace a
critique of nationalism in Jacques Derrida’s writing from such early essays as “The Ends of
Man” to the more recent Specters of Marx. As Pheng Cheah has argued, for Derrida “nation-
alism is without promise. It can promise nothing and has no future to-come” (177). The most
forceful theoretical critique of nationalism from a postcolonial perspective has been provided
by Partha Chatterjee in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. On nationalism and class
in the British context see Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain. On nationalism, gender, and
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sexuality see the essays collected in Andrew Parker’s Nationalism and Sexuality. An excellent
overview of the problematic of nation in the context of the study of Canadian literature is
provided by Jonathan Kertzer’s Worrying the Nation: Imagining a National Literature in
English Canada.
2 As Earl Jeffrey Richards notes, Ernst Cassier’s Philosophy of the Enlightenment [1932]
long ago asserted the interconnection of aesthetic theory and nationalism (Richards 137-38).
In a Canadian context, Dermot McCarthy has argued suggestively that there is a “(con)fusing
of aesthetic form and national coherence” (33) in Canadian literary histories from the nine-
teenth century well into the twentieth. In the context of German literature the implicit or
explicit homologies between aesthetic form and national identity have been explored by
David Morgan.
3 See Earl Jeffrey Richards’s “The Axiomatization of National Differences and National
Character in the European Enlightenment” for an exploration of the construction of national
character as a dialectic synthesis of other nations conceived as static polarities (152 and pas-
sim).
4 The quotation derives from “The Sublime of the Nation,” a paper delivered at
McMaster University in 1996. A revised and expanded version of the paper will appear as a
chapter in Balfour’s forthcoming book on the sublime.
5 The characterization of Schlegel’s theory of irony that follows draws upon the lengthy
history of scholarship that interprets and debates the meaning of Schlegel’s concept of irony.
To see Schegel’s theory of irony as being homologous to his construction of German national
identity is, however, my own approach, which I am exploring at greater length in a book-
length manuscript on the development of  the theory of irony. For several key statements on
Schlegelian irony, see Immerwahr, Eichner (69-74), Szondi, and Handwerk (18-43).
6 My quotations from Schlegel are taken from Philosophical Fragments, translated by
Peter Firchow.
The fragments are referred to by the title and number given to separately titled and
numbered series. In this respect the collection follows the standard critical edition of Schlegel’s
work, Kritische Friedrich Schlegel-Ausgabe. The fragment series are known — respectively in the
order that they appear in Philosophical Fragments — as the Lyceum Fragments (or Critical Frag-
ments) Athenaeum Fragments, and Ideas.
7 Tara Palmer Seiler’s “Multi-Vocality and National Literature” tries suggestively to
think through the ways in which the traditionally unifying, national-character-positing func-
tion of a Canadian national literature (as Seiler sees its role to have been) might be conceived
in conjunction with, rather than opposition to, the current emphasis upon diversity and plu-
rality. In this respect she draws upon Charles Taylor’s argument for a sense deep diversity and
belonging within the nation (62-63 and passim).
8 In Romanticism, Nationalism and the Revolt Against Theory, David Simpson like-
wise traces  how the English have long defined themselves as a “culture of commonsense”
mediation in opposition to broadly circulated images of the French and the Germans; both
peoples are capable of being represented for the purposes of such a privileged English syn-
thesis as being characterized by either an excess of bodily passion or theoretical abstraction
(40-103).
9 For an analysis of Schiller’s aesthetic as a nothingness of pure potentiality and the
ideological implications of such a conception, see Terry Eagleton’s Ideology of the Aesthetic
(102-19, esp.107-08). For a compelling critique of the recuperative aspects of Kroetsch’s
postmodern negativity, see David L. Clark, “Forget Heidegger; or, Why I am Such a Clever
Postmodernist.”
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